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Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics 
in Antitrust Analysis 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
I.  Introduction 
This article offers some thoughts about the present place of transaction cost 
economics (TCE) in antitrust law, focusing particularly on contract arrangements 
involving vertically related firms or complementary products.  At this writing, thirty-five 
years have passed since Oliver E. Williamson published Markets and Hierarchies: 
Analysis and Antitrust Implications.1  At that time vertical price and nonprice restraints 
as well as tying were unlawful per se.2  While not per se unlawful, both exclusive 
dealing and vertical mergers were treated much more harshly than they are now, and so 
was vertical integration by dominant firms.3  TCE analysis of these practices lay largely 
in the future, but it was destined to develop a line of thinking that avoided the extreme 
positions of the two reigning schools of antitrust policy.  
At one extreme was the “structural” school, which drew its impetus from a 
number of sources, including the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914 and the expansion 
of  section 7 of that statute in 1950 to cover vertical mergers.4  At its origins lay the 
                                            
*Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.   
Thanks to Erik Hovenkamp for reading a draft. 
1 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 
(1975).  One of Williamson’s best pieces on the use of transaction cost economics in antitrust was 
actually published a year earlier.  Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost 
Considerations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (1974). 
2 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (RPM unlawful per se), 
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (RPM to be 
governed by rule of reason); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (maximum RPM unlawful per 
se), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (maximum RPM brought under rule of 
reason); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (vertical nonprice restraints 
unlawful per se), overruled by Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 366 (1977) (vertical nonprice 
restraints governed by rule of reason); Times-Picayune Publ’g. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) 
(stating per se rule for tying arrangements in the presence of tying market power); Jefferson Parish Hosp. 
Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (dicta reaffirming per se tying rule). 
3 Standard Oil Co. (Cal.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (condemning exclusive dealing under 
harsh test); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (condemning vertical merger on 
modest market shares).  On vertical integration de novo, see United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 
106 (1911) (condemning vertical integration into collateral goods such as foil used in manufacturing 
tobacco products); United States v. Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (reversing dismissal of complaint 
challenging cab manufacturer’s acquisition of operating licenses); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 
334 U.S. 131 (1948) (same; vertical integration from motion picture production into distribution). 
4 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006); Cellar–Kefauver Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1225.  On the 
amendments, see Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1592476
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Great Depression and the rise of monopolistic competition theory in the early thirties,5 
which in different ways undermined our confidence that markets for manufactured, 
product-differentiated goods would perform competitively.  The industrial organization 
theory of the structural school developed the structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P)  
paradigm, which saw firm structure as the principal determinant of anticompetitive 
behavior and poor economic performance.6   Under the model, structure entailed 
conduct of a certain kind, and the conduct entailed poor performance.  As a result 
conduct dropped out as a variable of interest and one could reason directly from 
structure to performance. 
 The promoters of the S-C-P paradigm tended to believe that monopoly power 
was widespread, as were the opportunities for its exercise.7  Building on a neoclassical 
model in which sellers placed their goods on the market and purchasers bought them 
mainly in single-shot transactions, they were suspicious of any type of “irregularity” or 
deviation from common law contract models for distribution, generally seeing these as 
instances of monopolistic conduct.  This animosity showed up in competition policy in 
various ways.  One was discomfort with product differentiation and the blunting of 
competition that was commonly thought to attend it.8  Another was elevated suspicion 
about both ownership vertical integration and vertical contractual practices such as 
tying, exclusive dealing, resale price maintenance or related restraints.  Antitrust policy 
became hostile toward all of them.  At its core lay the “leverage” theory, which feared 
that a monopolist could easily “exploit[] his dominant position in one market to expand 
his empire into the next.”9 
Much, although certainly not all, of this theory originated in the Harvard 
economics department.10  Further, while structuralism is sometimes associated with a 
Harvard school of antitrust, Harvard’s own economists and antitrust scholars 
abandoned most of it more than thirty years ago, prior to the time that TCE became well 
                                                                                                                                            
HARV. L. REV. 226, 234–36 (1960); Herbert Hovenkamp, Derek Bok and the Merger of Law and 
Economics, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 515, 516 (1988). 
5 EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933). 
6 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 
217 (2009). 
7 See, e.g., CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS (1959); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1959); JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW 
COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956). 
8 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880–1960, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 863, 911 (2010) (describing increasing ambivalence about product differentiation).  See, 
e.g., CHAMBERLIN, supra note 5, at123 (product differentiation as leading to excessive vertical 
integration); BAIN, BARRIERS, supra note 7, at 142–43, 212 (1956) (product differentiation as barrier to 
entry). 
9 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 (1992) (quoting Times-
Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953), which in turn was paraphrasing United 
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1948) (“When the buying power of the entire circuit is used to 
negotiate films for his competitive as well as his closed towns, he is using monopoly power to expand his 
empire.”)). 
10 See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis:  1890–1955, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 311 (2009). 
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established in the economics literature.11  The leverage theory itself never dominated 
Harvard industrial organization theory or competition policy.  Rather the concern was 
foreclosure, or the idea that firms could use pricing, vertical restrictions or  intellectual 
property (IP) licensing practices to exclude rivals from otherwise profitable markets.12   
 At the other extreme was the Chicago school position, whose theory of vertical 
integration began with the collapse of the “leverage” theory in the 1950s,13 and 
developed into a more general argument that vertical ownership and contract integration 
should be lawful per se, with perhaps an exception for practices shown to facilitate 
horizontal collusion.14  As did the Harvard school, the Chicago school tended to see the 
economic landscape in terms of competition and monopoly.  They saw far fewer 
situations where monopoly could be created or maintained for long periods, however, 
and they disputed the notion that a monopolist in one market could readily leverage its 
monopoly position into related markets.15 
The critique of the leverage theory showed that in a basic tying situation a firm 
with market power and the ability to charge prices above cost could not increase its 
overcharge by tying or other forms of vertical integration.  To the contrary, in the case of 
successive or complementary firms with market power, combining two products or 
process stages into a single firm would actually increase output and reduce price by 
eliminating double marginalization.16  The dominant Chicago view about tying 
established in the critique of leveraging was that it was a form of price discrimination, 
which permitted a monopolist to extract more profits but also typically increased 
output.17  As a result there was no reason based on economic welfare grounds for 
condemning ties. 
Since the 1970s both the old Harvard and the traditional Chicago positions have 
moved from opposite directions toward the center, partly as a result of the influence of 
transaction cost analysis.  Today their differences on many issues are not all that 
considerable.  In 1978, only three years after Markets and Hierarchies was published, 
Areeda and Turner produced the first three volumes of the Antitrust Law treatise, whose 
                                            
11 See infra text accompanying notes 18–28.  One exception is Einer Elhauge, who favors bringing 
back the leverage theory of tying.  See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of 
the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009). 
12 See Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy, supra note 10, at 362–67.  On foreclosure, see 
infra text accompanying notes 139–47. 
13 See, e.g., Ward Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 
(1957). 
14 These views were consolidated and popularized by ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: 
A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); see also Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust 
Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH (1976). 
15See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 
(1979).  
16 See, e.g., Joseph Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950); 
see also infra text accompanying notes 74–75. 
17Bowman, supra note 13. 
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second volume entirely repudiated the leverage theory,18 and whose third volume very 
substantially repudiated the structuralist position on vertical integration.19  The 
recommendations offered by Areeda and Turner were starkly different from those 
offered by Turner and Carl Kaysen two decades earlier in Antitrust Policy, indicating that 
Turner himself had undergone a remarkable conversion experience.20 
 The Antitrust Law treatise originated at Harvard Law School in the 1970s with the 
work of Phillip E. Areeda and Donald F. Turner.  Antitrust Law is fundamentally a 
resource for antitrust lawyers and legal scholars.  It is not a work of economics, and it 
has never explicitly embraced any particular economic “school.”  At no time in its history 
could it be identified with the old Harvard school, which was closely associated with the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm in industrial organization, and it has 
consistently opposed applications of the leverage theory.21  Nor has it ever explicitly 
embraced the Chicago school.  The Antitrust Law treatise is in fact something of an 
economics scavenger, picking and choosing among economics’ diverse theories for 
doctrine that is both theoretically defensible and administratively useful.  Its economics 
reflects the fact that both the Harvard and Chicago schools have moderated their views 
toward the center.  To a significant extent it has embraced transaction cost analysis of 
such things as vertical restraints, tying, exclusive dealing, exclusionary practices by 
dominant firms, mergers, joint ventures, and enforcement costs.  In sum, it has taken 
advantage of the fact that transaction cost analysis does two things at the same time.  
First, unlike the traditional leverage or “hostility” theory, it rejects the notion that the 
practices in the list are inherently suspicious.  Most of the time they are beneficial 
because they reduce either production or transaction costs.  At the same time, it also 
rejects many assumptions about costless and instantaneous entry, easy resource 
mobility, and limitlessly rational market participants that characterized the neoclassical 
price theory approach to antitrust and have been attributed to Chicago school antitrust 
analysis. 
On tying and leverage, Areeda and Turner’s 1978 volumes completely accepted 
the Chicago school critique of the leverage doctrine.  They concluded that a firm with 
market power in a tying product could charge an above-market price for a tied product 
only by making a corresponding reduction in the tying product’s price.  Otherwise a 
rational person would not purchase.22  As a result, they concluded, the purchaser of the 
tied-up package “was not injured” by an overcharge.  Indeed, the authors somewhat 
optimistically opined that the Supreme Court, given its recent decision in Fortner II, was 
                                            
18 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 347a, b (1978). 
19 See 3 id., ch. 7D. 
20 See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 7 (advocating harsh rules for tying, exclusive dealing, and 
vertical mergers).  See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Areeda/Turner on Antitrust: A Hobson’s 
Choice, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 735 (1996). 
21 See Hovenkamp, supra note 10. 
22 See 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 18, ¶ 347, at 251 (“[U]nless the benefit equaled or exceeded 
the increment, a rational person in the plaintiff’s position would not have entered into the arrangement at 
all.”). 
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on the verge of recognizing that fact.23  In the same discussion Areeda and Turner 
acknowledged that a principal use of variable proportion ties, as in franchises, is price 
discrimination.  Once again they rejected leveraging and argued that such ties are 
nothing more than substitutes for a royalty based on sales for use of the franchisor’s 
“name and methods.”24  In this case “[t]he defendant was certainly entitled to charge a 
franchise fee, and the plaintiff’s voluntary entry into the . . . business demonstrated that 
the incremental charge for the tied item was what the plaintiffs were willing to pay for the 
franchise.”25  Areeda and Turner then concluded: 
Now there is one ground on which the plaintiff might claim that he was 
injured by the tie.  In cases like Chicken Delight,26 the tie facilitates price 
discrimination.  By requiring the franchisee to pay an incremental price on some 
product whose use varies in proportion to his business, the franchisor collects 
more from the more successful franchisee than from the less successful—just as 
is customarily and lawfully done through a franchise fee based on the 
franchisee’s gross (or net) revenues.”27 
They concluded, however, that even the successful franchisee forced to pay more for 
the franchise as a result of a price discrimination tie suffers no antitrust injury.  A 
franchisee fee based on revenues would clearly have been lawful and would have 
caused no greater harm.28 
 Speaking more generally of vertical integration by the monopolist, Areeda and 
Turner largely repudiated a half-century of hostility toward vertical integration in the 
structuralist economic literature, concluding: 
• “Without substantial market power at any one production or distribution stage, 
vertical integration lacks antitrust significance.  It is either competitively 
neutral or affirmatively desirable because it promotes efficiency.”29 
• On leveraging: “There is a maximum monopoly profit to be earned from the 
eventual sale of an end product . . . .  Unless there are diseconomies of 
integration, monopolization of a second stage would not ordinarily lead to 
higher prices or lower output . . . .  Vertical integration by a monopolist can 
lead to lower prices, higher output, and other economic benefits where the 
                                            
23Id. at 252 (“The Supreme Court may thus be ready to recognize, when it focuses on the question, 
that such plaintiffs as Fortner have not suffered injury,” speaking of the Supreme Court’s two decisions in 
Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), and 429 U.S. 610 (1977)).  The Fortner cases 
involved tying of expensive homes with below market rate financing. 
242 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 18, ¶ 347, at 253. [HH: can you leave date in here?  Point is that 
this was stated in the original edition, not the current edition] 
25 Id. 
26 Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) (condemning a franchise tie of 
common consumable goods by a nonmonopolist without requiring any showing of market power other 
than the franchisor’s trademarks). 
27 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 18,  ¶ 347, at 253–54. 
28 Id. ¶ 347, at 254. 
29 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 18, ¶ 724, at 195. 
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second stage had previously been monopolized or otherwise characterized by 
non-competitive performance.”30 
• On double marginalization,31 Areeda and Turner recognized that “[i]ntegration 
of two successive monopolies can lead to a higher output and a lower end-
product price.”32  Further, if successive monopolists were able to agree with 
each other they could reach the joint maximizing level, resulting in lower 
prices and higher output.  In Coasean fashion they concluded that upon 
recognizing double marginalization, “rational successive monopolists would 
treat themselves as a unit in order to set that end-product price and output 
that maximize aggregate profit . . . .”  Further, when such an agreement was 
impossible, “forward integration into what was previously a monopoly or 
oligopoly stage is likely to improve matters.”33 
Additionally, in both the original and current editions the Antitrust Law treatise 
has opposed the recognition of a Sherman Act section 2 “monopoly leveraging” offense, 
involving the use of monopoly power in one market to leverage a competitive advantage 
in a second market.34 
Perhaps Areeda’s and Turner’s greatest sensitivity to transaction costs lay in 
their attempt to formulate antitrust rules so as to reduce administrative and error costs.  
For example, they repeatedly argued that antitrust lacks the machinery to consider long 
run problems or engage in fine theoretical analysis.  Thus, for example, they argued for 
the average variable cost test in predatory pricing,35 a proposal that Williamson later 
faulted for creating a “defendant’s paradise”36 and that the Chicago school’s Richard A. 
Posner has characterized as “toothless.”37  In subsequent years the Antitrust Law 
treatise increasingly embraced transaction cost analysis in ad hoc fashion, noticeably in 
its analysis of vertical integration by the monopolist, vertical and conglomerate mergers, 
vertical price and nonprice restraints, tying, exclusive dealing, joint ventures and IP 
licensing.38 
Robert Bork’s Antitrust Paradox, which was published the same year as Areeda’s 
and Turner’s original volumes, clung to a more orthodox Chicago position.  Bork cited 
Williamson’s work several times, although on merger efficiencies rather than transaction 
                                            
30 Id. ¶ 724, at 198; see also id. ¶ 725b at 199 (against leveraging; “[n]o ‘double’ monopoly profit”). 
31 For an explanation, see infra text accompanying notes 74–75 and accompanying figure. 
32 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 18, ¶ 725c, at 200-201.. 
33 Id. 
34 In the original edition, seeid., ¶626d-g, at 79-83;  In the current edition, see  ¶652 at 130-142 (3d 
ed. 2008). 
35 3 id., ch. 3C. 
36 Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 305 
(1977). 
37 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 217–23 (2d ed. 2001). 
38 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ch. 7D (vertical integration by 
monopolist), ch. 16 (vertical price and nonprice restraints), ch. 17 (tying), ch. 18 (exclusive dealing), chs. 
19–22 (horizontal agreements; licensing practices; joint ventures) (2d & 3d eds. 2004–2010). 
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cost economics.39  Nevertheless, certain positions that we instinctively associate with 
the Chicago school, such as Lester Telser’s free rider explanation for resale price 
maintenance (RPM), are in fact a form of transaction cost analysis.  While Telser did not 
explicitly rely on Coase, his well-known essay on RPM is about the costs of alternative 
mechanisms for provision of retailer services.  For example, Telser concluded that a 
firm would choose self-distribution or distribution through independent agents 
depending on the relative costs of doing so.40  Further, he argued, in the absence of 
RPM retailers would offer differing levels of service depending on their own individual 
cost and demand functions.  The manufacturer might try to use contract provisions to 
require optimal dealer services, but monitoring and enforcement costs would make 
these unattractive.41  As a result, RPM was often the best solution, permitting dealers to 
compete with each other in service provision until their costs rose to the maintained 
price.42  Further, this investment in RPM performed a consumer education function that, 
at the margin, was a substitute for direct national advertising to consumers.43 These 
were distinctively transaction cost arguments, as Oliver Williamson himself would later 
recognize.44 
 Interestingly, Bork’s chapter on vertical restraints and RPM45 says almost 
nothing about transactions costs and makes very brief mention of free-rider problems,46 
which by that time had a well-established Chicago School literature.  He concluded, 
largely from an analysis of market power and the severely limited opportunities for 
expanding it by vertical contracting, that “every vertical restraint should be completely 
lawful.”47  Of course one must not forget that Ronald Coase, who must be considered 
the grandparent of TCE if Williamson is the parent, himself spent the greater part of his 
career at the University of Chicago.  Bork did not cite him.  For Bork, monopoly is what it 
is, cannot be expanded contractually, and is readily dissipated by new entry. 
 To say that the rise of transaction cost economics is solely responsible for the re-
alignment of antitrust policy that has occurred since the 1970s is certainly an 
exaggeration.  However, TCE has helped antitrust develop a new “center,” which has 
influenced both the case law and the academic literature in ways that are difficult to 
exaggerate.  TCE’s powerful analytic tools function simultaneously as a critique of both 
                                            
39 See BORK, supra note 14, at 107–12 (merger efficiencies); at 123–25 (efficiencies as an antitrust 
defense generally); at 127–32 (same, focusing on mergers); at 179, 196, 219 (same). 
40 See Lester Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 87 (1960). 
41 Id. at 94 (“[I]t is easier to police violations of minimum prices than to survey retailers to see that 
they do indeed provide the special services.”). 
42 Id. at 90. 
43 Id. at 94–95. 
44See Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the 
Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 959 n.26, 983 & n.101 (1979) (disputing Posner’s 
memory of the Schwinn litigation and recognizing Telser’s free rider argument as a transaction cost 
approach). 
45BORK, supra note 14, at 280–98. 
46 Id. at 290.  Bork does mention free rider problems again in an appendix on market division and 
price fixing.  Id. at 430–31, 435. 
47 Id. at 288. 
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the leverage theory and the belief that pricing and vertical practices are virtually never 
anticompetitive.  The result has been to position antitrust analysis somewhere in the 
middle, although somewhat closer to the Chicago “benign” position than to the inherent 
hostility position reflected by structuralism and the traditional leverage theory. 
II. Antitrust, Markets, and TCE 
Antitrust policy must make reasonable assumptions about both the goals of 
business firms and their capabilities.  We generally assume that business firms organize 
their activities so as to maximize their value, which they can do both by economizing, or 
reducing costs, and also by obtaining profits from sales at prices in excess of cost. 
Today we largely accept Coase’s position that a firm’s structure is determined by its 
continuous comparison of the costs and benefits of internal production against those of 
market procurement.  Perhaps departing from Coase, however, sensible antitrust policy 
recognizes that both advantageous contracting and monopoly can be profitable to a 
firm, and it can be expected to pursue both when they are available.  Nevertheless, the 
opportunities for economizing are many, while those for monopoly are relatively few. 
Further, firms always make decisions from the perspective of their present 
position, which necessarily includes the consequences of decisions made in the past.  
The movement of resources from the current position is costly, and one of these costs is 
that of relying on the market.  One of the first choices firms must make is whether to use 
internal production or external procurement for a particular input or process.  
Economizing on this decision requires selection of the alternative that will produce the 
greatest marginal value, and the aggregation of these decisions will determine the firm’s 
boundaries.  The boundary of the firm lies along the line where the marginal cost of 
internal production and that of market procurement are in equipoise.48 
Remaining business must be conducted by reaching agreements with others.  
When products and distribution are specialized, many of a firm’s contractual 
arrangements with others must necessarily be of long term and somewhat open ended, 
in the sense that they do not anticipate every conceivable circumstance.  As a general 
matter, product differentiation specializes firms at all levels and this has two effects.  
First, it tends to make firms larger vertically, because the cost of internal production is 
relatively lower and the cost of market procurement relatively higher.  Secondly, insofar 
as a firm uses external procurement its contractual relationships become more durable 
and more complex because the parties must often make substantial commitments to the 
technologies and product designs of their trading partners.49   For all such agreements, 
however, the firm assumes that trading partners are rational maximizers of their own 
value and will exploit every value-creating opportunity that the market presents.  While 
all participants are rational, they do not have perfect information and they almost always 
know more about themselves than about others.  A rational firm anticipates that, to the 
                                            
48 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutonalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 85 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1538279. 
49 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 66, 93–119 (1996). 
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extent uncertainty exists, everyone in the market will try to use new situations to their 
own advantage, itself included. 
Finally, and significantly, one of the many costs of resource movement is the 
administrative cost of the cumbersome and imperfect machinery antitrust uses to 
analyze and deter anticompetitive practices.  To the extent that the goal of competition 
policy is to increase wealth, administrative costs may counsel that certain practices be 
left unchallenged because the gains from enforcement will not exceed losses when 
enforcement costs themselves, including error costs, are included.50  
This framework generally produces antitrust rules that are far more benign than 
the old “hostility” tradition, but somewhat more aggressive than the Chicago school 
promoted.  Most importantly, while transaction costs and other resource movement 
costs provide benign explanations for many practices that the hostility tradition 
condemned, they can occasionally have the opposite effect.  For example, transaction 
costs can create entry barriers or make other forms of market movement sticky and thus 
increase both the possibility and duration of monopoly.  In a well functioning market a 
manufacturer and its dealers will bargain to the maximizing position, which is also the 
position that benefits consumers.  In the real world, however, transaction costs may 
enable dealer cartels or powerful individual dealers to impose restraints that are 
competitively suboptimal for both the manufacturer and consumers.  In that case, 
antitrust has a role to play.51 
One important conceptual tool for antitrust analysis is what might be called a 
“Coasean,” as opposed to neoclassical, market.  Williamson has repeatedly noted that 
the fundamental unit of analysis in TCE is the transaction: “The transaction is the basic 
unit of analysis, whereas orthodoxy [neoclassicism] is concerned with composite goods 
and services.”52  While that is true, it assumes away the critical question of who 
transacts with whom.  A distinctive feature of TCE is that it does not assume that each 
trader has a range of trading partners that is coextensive with the product and 
geographic market at issue.  Rather, transactions occur in a setting that limits the range 
of trading partners depending on knowledge, previous investment or technological 
commitment, and past history. This limited range in turn affects the types of contracts 
that the partners make with one another.  In sum, the question of who can trade is at 
least as important as the question of the terms of trading. 
Ronald Coase’s famous essay, The Problem of Social Cost, examined economic 
relationships in very small markets.53  The best-known example in that article is the 
bargaining that occurred between Sturges and Bridgman, a physician and confectioner 
                                            
50 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 54–56 
(2005). 
51 See infra text accompanying notes 84–90. 
52 WILLIAMSON, supra note 49, at 6; see also id. at 26, 45, 235; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15–42 (1985). 
53 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Coasean Markets, 29 EUR. J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1580059. 
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who were the parties to a now-famous common law nuisance suit.54  The two owned 
adjacent businesses connected by a party wall in the same building.  Physician Sturges 
complained that when Bridgman operated his mechanical mortar and pestle the 
thumping noise made it impossible for Bridgman to practice medicine—in particular, to 
use his stethoscope.55  Bridgman brought a successful nuisance action against Sturges, 
but Coase used the case as a vehicle to explain that the common law of nuisance is not 
about wrongdoers, but rather about inconsistent uses and the assignment of legal rules 
to decide which one should be favored.  Coase famously argued that in the absence of 
transaction costs the parties would reach a bargain that was both efficient, in the sense 
that it maximized the parties’ joint wealth, and invariant to the underlying legal rule.  This 
latter statement meant that if the parties were able to bargain their way to a settlement, 
the more valuable use would survive whether or not the law deemed it a nuisance.  By 
contrast, if transaction costs were sufficiently high, the choice of the initial legal rule 
might be the one that prevailed even if it were not the most efficient.  In sum, transaction 
costs are what give the common law legal system its relevance. 
 None of this exercise had much to do with antitrust.  However, Coase did identify 
a rather special and very small market for purposes of economic analysis.  At the time 
Sturges v. Bridgman was decided London undoubtedly contained hundreds if not 
thousands of physicians and at least as many confectioners.  Further, there were 
certainly thousands of locations from which the two trades could be practiced.  
Nevertheless, the relationship between Sturges and Bridgman was unquestionably a 
“market” in which the two were forced to bargain with one another.  This market existed 
by virtue of previous commitments.  Sturges and Bridgman had locked themselves into 
a situation from which extraction was costly.  If either Sturges or Bridgman could 
costlessly have relocated to another location that was equally satisfactory in every way 
then no dispute would ever have gone to court.  These “Coasean markets” are in fact a 
form of bilateral monopoly. 
At the most general level, the use of transaction cost economics in antitrust is an 
exercise in examining conduct by reference to Coasean markets, while power is 
assessed by reference to neoclassical markets.  Indeed, for Williamson market power 
becomes the defining characteristic and a strong prerequisite for anticompetitive vertical 
arrangements.56  Analyzing business firm conduct in a Coasean market is important for 
understanding its rationales and the full range of possible effects, but analyzing it in 
relation to the larger neoclassical market is essential to determining whether the 
conduct poses a threat to the economy generally.  As long as antitrust policy has kept 
these two kinds of markets distinct, transaction cost analysis has provided a powerful 
tool for antitrust analysis.  Occasionally, as in the 1992 Kodak decision,57 the courts 
have confused one type of market with the other and sent antitrust policy off in the 
wrong direction. 
 
                                            
54 Sturges vs. Bridgman, LR 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879). 
55 See A.W. Brian Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (1996). 
56 WILLIAMSON, supra note 49, at 287–95. 
57 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
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III. Coasean Markets and the Boundaries of Firms 
 Antitrust’s central behavioral concern is with business firm structure and business 
firm conduct that threaten to reduce marketwide output.  Coasean markets are 
interesting from an antitrust perspective because Coasean markets have precisely the 
same boundaries as Coasean firms.  In his 1937 essay, The Nature of the Firm, Coase 
argued that the costs of using the market determine the boundaries of the firm.58  Or, to 
say it differently, internal production and external procurement both impose costs, 
although the costs differ.  A firm intent on maximizing its value chooses internal 
production right up to the point that the marginal cost of producing internally equals the 
marginal cost of external procurement, and vice versa.59  The firm’s boundaries are 
defined by the line at which the two are in equipoise.  Precisely the same thing is true of 
Sturges and Bridgman, the physician and confectioner in Coase’s example.60  They 
maximize value by bargaining with each other up to the point that the marginal value of 
reaching a bargain equals the marginal value of moving away. 
 Transaction cost economics builds on this insight, which simultaneously tells us 
not only what a firm’s boundaries will be, but also who are likely to be its bargaining 
partners in outside markets and what those bargains will look like.  For example, an 
exclusivity provision in a contract permits a firm to retain some of the control and 
disciplinary advantages of internal production, while sharing investment costs and risk.  
When analyzed in this way a wide variety of practices, including but not limited to 
exclusive dealing, tying, loyalty discounts, and price and dealer placement restrictions, 
are nothing more than devices for permitting Coasean markets to behave more like 
firms. 
 Coase’s Nature of the Firm applied transaction cost analysis to determine when a 
firm uses internal coordination or the external market in order to procure certain inputs 
or distribution.  However, that article tended to treat the market itself as a kind of “black 
box,” in the sense that the only relevant decision was whether to make or to buy.  By 
contrast, The Problem of Social Cost focused on the problem of how bargaining results 
are achieved.  The subsequent work of Williamson and others discerned that the array 
of market choices are in fact incredibly diverse, ranging from simple one-shot “classical” 
contracts to long-term relational contracts capable of specifying everything that internal 
managers could specify.  The Problem of Social Cost also assumed that firms’ previous 
commitments determine the range of bargaining partners and the kinds of bargains that 
will maximize joint value. Sturges and Bridgman are not forced to bargain with each 
other because of the particular goods and services that they produce; those are sold in 
competitive markets by hundreds of firms.  Rather, they are locked together by asset 
specificity—the fact that each has invested in a particular business at a particular 
location, making extraction more costly than reaching a deal.  The relation between 
Sturges and Bridgman was the same as the relationship that existed between General 
Motors and Fisher Body Works when the two were independent firms.  They were 
                                            
58 Coase, supra note 48. 
59 See Hovenkamp, supra note 53. 
60 See supra text accompanying notes 54–55. 
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specialists locked to each other by previous commitments.61  Indeed, for Williamson 
asset specificity is the “most important and most distinctive” attribute of transaction cost 
economics.62 
 This analysis explains both firm structure and bargaining behavior without 
reference in the first instance to monopoly power.  The firm maximizes its own value by 
deciding whether to produce inside or procure outside; the participants in a Coasean 
market maximize joint value by bargaining that takes their previous commitments and 
long term goals into account.  Nothing need be said about output reduction or higher 
prices outside.  At the same time, however, efficient bargaining sometimes breaks 
down, leading to lower output and higher prices.  In those cases antitrust can have a 
role to play. 
IV. The Many Faces of Bilateral Monopoly; Double Marginalization 
A. TCE and bilateral monopoly 
Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost63 is an extension of the bilateral monopoly 
problem.  By virtue of previous commitments (asset specificity), pairs of firms are thrust 
into a position where the potential net payoff of reaching a further bargain is greater 
than the payoff of abandoning this position and starting over.  What makes these 
situations interesting is that firms seek them out because there are gains to be had from 
joint specialization.  I have used the term “Coasean market” rather than “bilateral 
monopoly” because these markets are not necessarily bilateral at all.  Often they involve 
many participants, such as the smokestack and the 100 downwind business- and home-
owners, or the national franchisor with 1000 franchisees.  Further, the term monopoly 
suggests something that these relationships are not.  In most cases, as in Sturges v. 
Bridgman, the bargainers have little or no market power in the various markets in which 
they sell their products or services.  They are monopolists only in the unique and very 
limited sense that efficient bargaining forces them to make deals with each other and no 
one else.  At the same time they are “markets” in the sense that the persons in them 
have a profit-based incentive to bargain with each other rather than moving outside.  
Coase implicitly assumed the existence of such markets in his writing, as has the 
extensive literature on transaction cost economics and the business firm.64 
Bargaining in Coasean markets typically yields arrangements and practices that 
seem inconsistent with perfect competition—transfer prices that are above cost, price 
discrimination and nonlinear pricing, exclusivity provisions, tying and bundling, and 
contractual impositions on the prices, locations, and practices of trading partners.  In 
                                            
61 See Ronald H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J.L. & ECON. 15 
(2000); see also Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-
General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 199 (1988). 
62 WILLIAMSON, supra note 49, at 45. 
63 Coase, supra note 53. 
64 E.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 49, at 59–70; Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. 
Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & 
ECON. 297 (1978). 
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classical political economy goods were generic and distribution was unspecialized.  As 
a result, everyone traded with everyone else.  Building on this premise, the leverage 
theory was inclined to be suspicious of situations where specific buyers and sellers in 
the distribution process were locked in to one another by long term contractual 
requirements.  This suspicion accounts for many of the harsh rules that antitrust applied 
to vertical contractual practices as well as vertical ownership integration through the 
1970s.65 
By contrast, the Chicago school understood that these practices are perfectly 
consistent with general competitive conditions, but its focus on the impossibility of 
leveraging inclined it not to see any opportunities for harm whatsoever.  That is, they 
tended to believe that no contract a monopolist or dominant firm made, other than 
collusion with rivals, would enable it to reduce output profitably more than it was already 
doing. 
For example, as noted above, free-riding—a transaction cost explanation—plays 
a very minor role in Bork’s analysis of RPM.66  The free rider explanation is a “defense” 
or at least an “explanation,” in the sense that it gives a benign accounting of a practice 
that is prima facie suspicious.  But Bork never got to that second point.  Rather, he tried 
to show that, however much power a firm had to begin with, it could not get more by 
RPM.  By contrast, the economics of transaction costs has produced a significant 
literature on the manifold nonmonopolistic rationales for RPM.67  Nevertheless, certain 
instances of RPM, particularly when instigated by dealers, represent opportunities for 
either monopoly or double marginalization, and both of those can cause real consumer 
losses.  As a result, as developed briefly below, antitrust intervention is sometimes 
appropriate. 
Coasean markets behave like bilateral monopolies in the sense that within them 
price is indeterminate.  As in any orthodox Coase theorem story, even if the firms are 
able to agree on the joint maximizing output, the price has to be bargained and there is 
no structurally “correct” single answer.  For example, if a manufacturer with market 
power has costs of $4, distribution costs of $3, and the profit-maximizing price is $10, 
there are $3 in economic profits to be made.  If the manufacturer can sell efficiently 
through a competitive dealer network it will retain the markup for itself, permitting the 
dealers only a competitive return.  However, if the dealership market is limited, the 
dealers themselves may have market power and may be in a position to bargain with 
the manufacturer over how the overcharge is distributed among them.  In an 
unstructured setting this lack of a determinate price can lead to cycling and instability 
                                            
65 On this point, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm, 95 
Iowa L. Rev. 863 (2010). 
66 See supra text accompanying notes 45–46. 
67 See, e.g., Williamson,supra note 44; Alan J. Meese, Exclusive Dealing, The Theory of the Firm, 
and Raising Rivals’ Costs: Toward a New Synthesis, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 371 (2005); Alan J. Meese, 
Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L. REV. 5 (2004); Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets 
the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
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problems.68  In most vertical business contracting settings, however, the contractual 
form establishes a “hierarchy” that imposes stability.  For example, in the typical 
franchise setting the franchisor establishes a contract form and bargains with each 
franchisee individually.  The franchisees may have little opportunity to collaborate with 
each other or cycle through counteroffers.  In this respect the structure of the franchise 
arrangement resembles a business firm more than a market. 
Fisher Body and General Motors represent an extreme case of cospecialization, 
where each firm’s previous commitments locked it into doing business with the other.  
However such situations are hardly rare.  Franchising is another, where often the 
franchisee firm lacks any identity apart from the name, business format and products of 
the franchisor.  For example, consider the vast number of independently owned 
McDonald’s franchises across the country, whose business methods, outward 
appearance and menus are virtually identical.  But even in less extreme situations 
dealers make investments that are specific to a particular manufacturer’s product, and 
manufacturers for their part make investments in these dealers.  This is how bilateral 
monopoly relationships get started, but both manufacturers and dealers embrace such 
opportunities in any event.  Indeed, the entire principle behind the development of 
modern contractual distribution systems is that the gains more than offset any 
transaction problems that arise from this form of co-investment.69 
Simple bilateral monopoly is not an antitrust problem because bilateral monopoly 
has no consequences for market prices and output.  For example, the relationship 
between physician Sturges and confectioner Bridgman is a bilateral monopoly even 
though physicians’ services, confectionary, and the buildings suitable to these 
professions are all sold in perfectly competitive markets.  In that case the parties might 
engage in costly bargaining or one of them might take advantage of the other in ways 
that implicate contract or perhaps tort law.  But no arrangement that they make has 
antitrust significance because the market output and price of medical services, 
confectionary, or commercial real estate will not be affected.  This was the error that the 
Supreme Court majority made in the 1992 Kodak case.  The customers’ purchase of 
durable Kodak photocopiers placed them into a bilateral monopoly relationship with 
Kodak to the extent that the customers needed aftermarket parts that only Kodak could 
supply.  In his dissent Justice Scalia likened the situation to one in which a swimming 
pool contractor discovers a five-ton boulder buried in the customer’s yard after 
excavation is well under way.  Unless this contingency has been specified in the 
contract the parties are now locked into a bilateral monopoly situation.70  However, 
residential back yards and swimming pool contractors are both competitive, and the 
resolution of this dispute will have no impact on the market price or output of homes, 
homes with swimming pools, contracting services, or any other antitrust market that 
might be relevant to the dispute.  It might, however, affect how wealth is distributed as 
between the contractor and the homeowner, and if bargaining breaks down it might 
                                            
68 See Hovenkamp, supra note 53.  On the economics of bilateral monopoly, see ROGER D. BLAIR 
AND JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 123-145 (2d ed. 2010) (in press). 
69See Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, supra note 64. 
70 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 497 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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mean a suboptimal resolution.  For example, the homeowner might refuse to pay any 
more causing the contractor to abandon the work and lose her investment.  Even if 
Kodak lacked market power in its photocopy machines, it still might have been able to 
extract high aftermarket prices from customers who needed repair parts and may have 
been able to deceive them initially about lifetime ownership costs.  But this is a matter 
for contract law or the tort law of misrepresentation, not of antitrust. 
When at least one firm in a distribution market has a serious amount of market 
power, however, the welfare of consumers depends on how well functioning the market 
is.  At that point, if bargaining breaks down, antitrust may have a role to play.  For 
example, suppose that A is a monopoly manufacturer of a product and B is its monopoly 
dealer, or B represents a cartel of all of A’s dealers in a particular retail market.  In a 
well functioning market A and B should be able to negotiate themselves to the profit-
maximizing output.  The division of the profits is indeterminate, but consumers would be 
indifferent to that outcome as well because the final price would be the same.  The 
extent of monopoly will not be greater because the firm in question uses restrictive 
contracts to distribute its product, provided that the dominant firm and its dealers reach 
the joint maximizing agreement. 
Nevertheless, this outcome is much less favorable than one alternative 
possibility, which occurs when B represents a group of dealers who are competitive vis-
à-vis one another.  To be sure, the “optimal” markup remains the same.  However, the 
indeterminacies of bilateral monopoly are such that a great amount of haggling and 
monitoring may be necessary to achieve it, and given that transaction costs are positive 
there is no good reason to think that it will be achieved.  So both monopolist A and 
consumers are better off if the dealership market operates competitively. 
Finally, if both the manufacturer and the dealer(s) have market power in their 
respective output markets the bilateral monopoly situation threatens double 
marginalization, which does injure consumers.  Double marginalization is fundamentally 
a transaction cost problem.71  That is, with zero transactions costs vertically related 
firms with market power would agree on the joint maximizing output, but in fact they 
frequently do not.  As far as antitrust policy is concerned, the best solution in markets 
where market power is capable of being exercised is to prevent bilateral monopoly 
situations from occurring in the first place.  The second best, where bilateral monopoly 
already exists, is to distinguish those practices reasonably calculated to permit the firms 
to reach the joint maximizing result from those which are likely to cause suboptimal 
bargaining and thus consumer harm. 
B. Double marginalization 
One situation in which bilateral monopoly raises competitive concerns is when it 
leads to double marginalization.72  This is a special case of bilateral monopoly that 
arises when the two firms also have market power in the greater markets in which they 
                                            
71 See part IV.A.  
72 On the basic economics, see W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., & JOHN M. VERNON, 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 238–41 (4th ed. 2005). 
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sell.  In that case the rest of the economy also has an interest in whether the two 
participants are able to reach a joint maximizing result. 
Double marginalization problems occur in both vertically related markets and 
markets for complements. The latter the situation is sometimes referred to as the 
“Cournot complements” problem, but the fundamental analysis is the same.73  The 
relationships among the producers of complementary products are akin to bilateral 
monopoly problems because one assumption is that the two firms involved cannot 
simply avoid the problem by dealing with someone else.  For instance, a gasoline 
refiner with market power might face a double-marginalization problem if a gasoline 
retailer downstream had market power in its own retail market as well, but the problem 
would not exist if the refiner could costlessly switch to a competitive retailer.  
Importantly, however, firms in a relationship where double marginalization is threatened 
may be in a position to bargain to the joint maximizing position, which is the single 
monopoly markup level.  That level not only maximizes the two firms’ aggregate profits, 
but it is also better for consumers because it leads to higher output and lower prices.  
Transaction cost analysis can play a major role in the assessment of Coasean markets 
(bilateral monopolies) where double marginalization is threatened. 
Consider the figure,  which illustrates a simple double marginalization problem. 
The demand curve, D, represents final demand for a good that has one manufacturer 
and one dealer.  The monopoly manufacturer has marginal costs of MC1 and maximizes 
its profits by equating marginal cost and marginal revenue, charging a price of P1 and 
reducing output to Q1.  The dealer, who is also a monopolist in its downstream market 
purchases at price P1 and maximizes its own profits.  For simplicity we assume that the 
dealer has no costs other than the cost of the good being sold.  As a result price P1 also 
represents the dealer’s marginal costs.  The dealer then sets a price determined by the 
intersection of its marginal cost curve with marginal revenue, that is, by engaging in 
“marginalization” a second time.  Now output drops to level Q1 and price rises to level 
P2.  If there were a third firm in the distribution chain, output would go down even further 
and price would rise even more.  In sum, the more monopolists in the distribution chain, 
the more output declines and prices go up.  In the figure, the demand curve is linear.  
As a result each successive monopolist cuts output in half.  However, the output 
reduction could be greater than or less than half depending on the shape of the demand 
curve.  The amount of the price increase with each successive monopolist depends on 






                                            
73 See, e.g., Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, Substituting Complements, 2 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 333 (2006). 
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Clearly double marginalization harms consumers.  Importantly, however, it is also 
suboptimal for the two sellers in the figure.  Under single monopoly, profits are equal to 
the rectangle fbce.  Under double marginalization, however, the manufacturer’s profits 
drop to rectangle fade and the retailer’s profits are ghaf.  Further, triangle hab 
represents a second “deadweight loss triangle”—that is, increased consumer harm that 
is not offset by increased producer profits.  Double marginalization both reduces 
aggregate supplier (manufacturer + dealer) profits and increases the monopoly 
deadweight loss. 
Consumers would be better off if the double marginalization was eliminated.  For 
example, the manufacturer might be able to find a competitively behaving dealer.74  
Alternatively, double marginalization could be eliminated if the manufacturer and dealer 
could agree with each other to divide up the profits available from rectangle fbce, thus 
restoring output and reducing price back to the single monopoly level.  This presents a 
classic problem in bilateral monopoly bargaining, no different from the one faced by 
Sturges and Bridgman.  The two firms are in a position to maximize value if they can 
agree about how to divide up the surplus.75  
However, while the joint maximizing output in the figure is clearly identified as 
quantity Q1 and price P1, the question of how the surplus that is available will be divided 
does not have a determinate answer.  As a result the parties may not be able to reach 
the joint maximizing result on their own.   
As noted previously, double marginalization can apply either to vertically related 
products or else to complements.  A precondition is that both firms have some market 
power and that one firm is not in a position to avoid the power of the other at low cost by 
dealing with someone else.  That is, double marginalization is a special case of bilateral 
monopoly.  In cases of oligopoly there might be more than one firm at each level, but 
                                            
74 Or alternatively, the dealer could find a competitively behaving manufacturer. 
75 The manufacturer’s starting point is its possession of surplus fade.  The dealer’s starting point is 
ghfa.  Presumably neither will settle for a payoff that is less than those amounts.  The surplus to be 
divided is rectangle abcd, less ghfa. 
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each of the firms has some market power.76 Pricing in excess of marginal cost is 
common in product-differentiated markets.77  To that extent, the market power of 
vertically related firms is simply a cost of using the market as opposed to internal 
production.   
 As originally developed in the industrial organization and antitrust literature, the 
double marginalization problem was treated as one of static monopoly and the principal 
means of avoiding it was vertical merger or new entry.78  One very prominent industrial 
organization economist, Joe Bain, downplayed the problem.  He treated all forms of 
bilateral monopoly, including pairs of firms with power in their sales markets, as 
examples of countervailing power that would produce more competitive prices than 
single-level monopoly.79  Today we are more likely to view double marginalization as a 
transacting problem in which ownership vertical integration is only one of the 
alternatives for addressing it.  Basically, firms faced with double marginalization have 
three choices: 
(1) accept the consequences of double marginalization, which might be the best 
alternative if internal production is costly and alternative (3) is unavailable; for 
example, a manufacturer selling to a market-dominating local dealer may 
have no choice but to accept that dealer’s high markups as a cost of doing 
business; 
(2) the neoclassical solution, which is integrate by ownership into the other 
production level, whether by merger or new entry; or 
(3) the “bargaining” solution, which is to enter into one of many types of 
contractual arrangements under which the two vertically related firms 
increase output and cut price to the joint maximizing level. 
Recognizing that both options (2) and (3) can result in lower prices and higher 
output, antitrust would respond with a more benign attitude toward vertical new entry, 
vertical acquisitions, and vertical contracting, although not necessarily with per se 
legality.  This of course requires examination of the economics of various types of 
distribution contracts.  Perversely, antitrust policy has been counterproductive to the 
                                            
76 For theory and evidence about how many firms must exist in each product grouping in order to 
avoid double marginalization problems, see Dari-Mattiacci & Parisi, supra note 73. 
77See, e.g., Robert E. Hall, The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry, 96 J. POL. 
ECON. 921 (1988). 
78 See, e.g., Spengler, supra note 16; Fritz Machlup & Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive 
Monopoly, and Vertical Integration, 27 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 101 (May, 1960); Gerhard Tintner, The 
Problem of Bilateral Monopoly: A Note, 47 J. POL. ECON. 263 (1939).  An important departure from that 
tradition is Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, A Note on Bilateral Monopoly and Formula Price 
Contracts, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 460 (1987).  See also FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 537–40 (3d ed. 1990), who compute output in 
situations where the two firms act independently, where the buyer acts as a Cournot price leader, where 
the seller does the same, and under ownership integration, but not under bargaining to the profit-
maximizing result. 
79 JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 7, at 140–42, 334–37. 
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extent that it has prohibited the parties from reaching a bargain that will maximize their 
joint profits.  For example, until Albrecht was overruled in 1997,80 maximum RPM was 
per se unlawful.  The most likely use of maximum RPM is to prohibit dealers from taking 
greater-than-competitive markups.  As a result, antitrust policy made this route toward 
elimination of double marginalization unavailable.  As developed below, a harsh rule 
against tying and discounting practices can have similar effects.81 
C. Eliminating or reducing double marginalization as an antitrust defense 
 Antitrust is relevant to problems of double marginalization in two ways.  First, 
private contracting practices, both vertical and complementary as well as horizontal,82 
can be devices for eliminating or reducing it, thus benefitting consumers.  Second, 
double marginalization serves to explain why some vertical practices are harmful, and 
transaction costs may serve to explain why private contracting is inadequate for 
addressing them.  Indeed, in some cases contracts can create or exacerbate double-
marginalization problems.  In these, antitrust intervention may be appropriate.83 
1. MAXIMUM RPM   As noted previously,84 maximum RPM is readily 
explained as a bargaining device for eliminating double marginalization.  In this case the 
upstream manufacturer or franchisor simply specifies a price level that will hold the 
dealer’s markup to costs.  Assuming that the dealer cannot enlarge its markup in other 
ways, such as by reducing valuable services, the manufacturer can get back to the 
single monopoly price level.  If the manufacturer is a monopolist that price will reflect no 
more than the amount of power that it has.  If the manufacturer is a competitor, then the 
output price should be competitive as well.  For example, in the State Oil case, which 
overruled previous doctrine and adopted a rule of reason for maximum RPM, the 
individual dealer may have had power in its local retail market but there is no reason for 
                                            
80Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (maximum RPM unlawful per se), overruled by State 
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (maximum RPM brought under rule of reason); see 8 AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, ch. 16C. 
81 See infra text accompanying notes 93–100. 
82Various horizontal or quasi-horizontal practices, particularly in intellectual property licensing, can 
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ventures of producers of complements can yield joint maximizing outcomes, as can patent pools.  See, 
e.g., Alan Devlin, Standard-Setting and the Failure of Price Competition, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
217 (2009) (holdup problems in the context of standard setting can lead to double marginalization, which 
can be addressed through advance disclosure requirements); Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights 
and Standard Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002) (similar); Mark A. Lemley & Carl 
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (1996) (double marginalization from 
royalty “stacking,” which occurs when product development requires licenses from two or more 
independent licensors; in this case the required patents are presumably complements); Josh Lerner & Jean 
Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (2004) (double marginalization problems can be 
eliminated by means of patent pooling), Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, 
Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh 
Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001). 
83 Cf. Coase, supra note 53; Oliver E. Williamson, Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size, 75 
J. POL. ECON. 123 (1967). 
84 See supra text accompanying notes 80–81. 
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thinking that State Oil, a relatively small player in the much larger supply market, had 
significant market power.85 
2. DUAL DISTRIBUTION   Dual distribution occurs when a firm uses 
independent dealers and owned dealerships simultaneously.  Some earlier decisions 
held that dual distribution was an exacerbating factor that served to make a restraint 
horizontal,86 because the independent dealers competed with the manufacturer’s owned 
dealer.  More recently, however, the courts have uniformly recognized that dual 
distribution should be regarded as a vertical practice and assessed under the rule of 
reason.87 
As the literature on TCE has developed at great length, a firm can specify 
virtually everything in a contract that it can specify within an employment relationship or 
hierarchy.  So why the trouble and expense of maintaining two distribution modes?  One 
explanation is that dual distribution operates in the same way as maximum RPM does.  
It imposes maximum prices on dealers, not by contract, but rather by giving them a 
manufacturer-owned competitor. 88  For example, suppose that a reasonable distribution 
markup is from a wholesale price of $8 to a retail price of $10, but that an independent 
dealer or dealers in an area persistently charges prices in the $12–$14 range.  The 
manufacturer could eliminate this double marginalization either by imposing maximum 
RPM to a retail price of $10, or else it could place its company-owned dealership in the 
area and charge a retail price of $10, thus forcing independent dealers to compete with 
it.  For thirty years prior to 1997, maximum RPM was unlawful per se,89 and this very 
likely made dual distribution an attractive alternative.  Today a firm would be likely to 
select contractual as opposed to self-distribution in a particular area by making the 
same calculation that the business firm always makes—that is, by comparing net 
marginal costs and gains from the two forms of distribution.  The exercise of market 
power by dealers is a cost of using the market.  Clearly, elimination of double 
marginalization could be one source of gain to both manufacturers and consumers. 
3. QUANTITY AND LOYALTY DISCOUNTS   Another easy example of 
elimination of double marginalization is the quantity discount, which can be a device for 
the manufacturer and dealer to share the gains that result from reaching the joint-
                                            
85 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); see 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, ch. 16C. 
86 See, e.g., United States v. McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. 305, 313 (1956) (dicta that wholly 
owned dealers are “in competition with” independent dealers); Hobart Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, 
Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1973); Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 103–04 (3d Cir. 1976); 
Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711, 721–23 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 
1969). 
87 Elecs. Commc’ns Corp. v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc., 129 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Mesirow v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 703 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1983); Graphic Products Distribs., Inc. v. ITEK 
Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983); Davis Watkins v. Serv. Merch., 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982); 
Copy-Data Sys., Inc. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 663 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1981); H & B Equip. Co. v. Int’l 
Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978); see 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note  38. 
88 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE §11.6e (3d ed. 2005). 
89 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 
(1997). 
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maximizing output level.  Looking at the figure  above, suppose that without a discount a 
dealer would sell Q2 units at price P2.  Now the manufacturer offers a progressive 
quantity discount that reaches its maximum point at output level Q1. This rewards the 
dealer with a lower price for purchasing (and selling) more and in effect operates as a 
mechanism for sharing the monopoly markup.90  In order to succeed the discount would 
have to be sufficiently large so that the dealer can come out ahead by reducing its own 
price to level P1.  As the figure also illustrates, joint maximization produces enough 
surplus to permit this to occur. 
 A loyalty, or market share, discount differs from a quantity discount in that the 
discount is fixed to a percentage of the reseller’s purchases rather than an absolute 
quantity or dollar amount.91  Loyalty discounts are better from the manufacturer’s 
viewpoint and more competitive than quantity discounts when the downstream market is 
concentrated and the firms are of various sizes.  Quantity discounts discriminate against 
smaller firms that are unable to purchase in the same volume as larger firms.  As a 
result, quantity discounts can give larger firms a price umbrella or in extreme cases 
even drive smaller firms out of the market altogether.  Once again, the concern is 
essentially of double marginalization: the manufacturer wants to keep the downstream 
market as competitive as possible, and keeping smaller firms in the market facilitates 
this goal.  For example, if the downstream market contains three large dealers and 
seven small ones, a quantity discount that the seven smaller dealers cannot obtain will 
give the three larger dealers a cost advantage over the others.  In an extreme case it 
could even drive the smaller dealers out of business.  In any event, the three larger 
dealers will be able to collude and reduce output below the manufacturer’s profit-
maximizing level. 
 Aside from these effects on the robustness of downstream competition, loyalty 
discounts do not have as direct an impact on reseller output as quantity discounts do.  
Nevertheless, they are very important in certain markets where high output is key to 
cost minimization.  This is true of any market subject to economies of scale, but 
particularly those with strong IP rights components. 
The Intel microprocessor situation may provide an example.  A large part of the 
cost of developing a microprocessor chip is R&D, design, and the manufacturing of 
dies.92  These costs are fixed over the production run of a particular chip, which is 
                                            
90 See Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust Law in the United 
States, 1 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 115 (2005). 
91 For other double marginalization issues that might be addressed by market share discounts akin to 
exclusive dealing, see Gianluca Faella, The Antitrust Assessment of Loyalty Discounts and Rebates, 4 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 375 (2008); Sreya Kolay, Greg Shaffer & Janusz Ordover, All-Units Discounts 
in Retail Contracts, 13 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 429 (2004). 
92 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The FTC’s Anticompetitive Pricing Case Against Intel, CPI ANTITRUST 
CHRON., Feb. 28, 2010, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546054; 
Herbert Hovenkamp, The FTC and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531136. 
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typically quite short.  As a result, per chip production costs are very sensitive to output.  
For example, if fixed development costs are $1 million and variable production costs are 
$100 per chip, then production of 1000 chips would incur costs of $1100 each ($1000 in 
amortized fixed costs plus $100 in production costs).  But a production run of 100,000 
chips would cut per chip costs to $110.  If Intel built computers itself it would produce all 
the chips it could consistent with computer demand.  But when it sells chips to computer 
manufacturers it is in a different situation.  For example, if it must bid a price in advance 
of the product cycle, the amount it can bid depends on the number of chips it can 
produce.  As reasonably anticipated output increases, the bid price can go down. 
For any given chip, future demand is subject to two kinds of risks.  One is a 
general market risk that the demand for computers of a certain type will fall.  The other 
is the risk that a computer manufacturer will switch significant purchases to a different 
manufacturer, thus reducing Intel’s output and raising per chip costs. 
In such a situation the optimal strategy may very well be for Intel to assume the 
market risk with respect to the chips.  After all, the computer manufacturers will be 
assuming it with respect to other parts of the computer.  Further, to the extent that the 
computer market is more competitive there may be less room for the manufacturers to 
assume such risks. 
The risk of individual manufacturer defection is a different problem, however, 
because it is within the control of the computer manufacturers themselves.  A market 
share discount effectively shares that risk with the computer manufacturer by making 
the lower price contingent on greater sales.  It basically tells the computer maker that a 
particular price is contingent on the computer maker’s use of a minimum number of 
chips in relation to market demand.  For example, setting market risks aside, if Intel can 
predict that manufacturers will use 800,000 chips next year for computers with a 
particular set of specifications it can bid a significantly lower price if it can have some 
confidence that it will claim, say, 70% of those sales than if it cannot. 
4. TYING AND BUNDLED DISCOUNTS   Many famous old tying cases 
involved tied products that were commodities sold in highly competitive markets, such 
as the dry ice in the Carbice93 case or the salt in International Salt.94  In those cases 
controlling double marginalization very likely does not explain the tie, although price 
discrimination might.95  The typical tied products today, however, are not commodities.  
They are usually manufactured products sold in product-differentiated markets, 
sometimes protected by IP rights,96 or else they are specialized services such as the 
                                            
93Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31–32 (1931). 
94Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
95 See infra text accompanying notes 115–37.  Price discrimination may not have explained the tie in 
International Salt, however, because the tying agreement required the lessee of the machine to use the 
defendant’s salt only if was sold at the competitive price.  If the lessee was able to find a lower price 
elsewhere that the lessor would not match then the lesee was free to purchase the salt elsewhere.  See Int’l 
Salt, 332 U.S. at 394–95 n.5.  The most likely explanation of this particular tie was quality control. 
96 E.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 861 (E.D. Ky. 2007) 
(denying summary judgment on claim that printer/cartridge technological tie was unlawful); Tucker v. 
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anesthesiology in the Jefferson Parish case.97  The relatively few exceptions occur 
mainly in franchising.98 
Tying almost always involves complementary products—that is, products that are 
more valuable if they are used together.  As noted previously, the double-
marginalization problem for complements, often called the “Cournot complements” 
problem, is similar to the one for vertical distribution.99  Indeed, the problem may be 
more severe because the producers of complementary products are not always in a 
position to deal with each other, while vertically related firms are.  As a result, 
opportunities for using bargaining to reach joint maximizing output levels may be 
scarcer or may look more suspicious to antitrust enforcers. 
The complementary goods problem might involve something like a computer and 
a printer, an MP3 digital music player and downloaded music,100 or a computer 
operating system and software applications.101  The products need not be monopolized, 
but they do need to be in a sufficiently differentiated or concentrated market that prices 
are above marginal cost.  They can be sold in either fixed or variable proportions.102  In 
such cases the printer manufacturer will charge its profit-maximizing price for the 
printer, and the cartridge manufacturer will do the same for its cartridge.  The two 
separate markups can be significantly higher than the combined markup that would be 
                                                                                                                                            
Apple Computer, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (refusing to dismiss complaint that 
iPod/iTunes tie was per se unlawful); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(refusing to dismiss Sherman Act section1 claim that tying of Microsoft Windows OS and Internet 
Explorer Browser was unlawful; condemning under Sherman Act section 2 Microsoft’s “commingling” of 
Windows and Internet Explorer code).  
97 E.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (dicta reaffirming per se tying rule). 
98 E.g., Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 447 n.6 (3d Cir. 1998) (pizza 
dough); Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379 (5th Cir. 1994) (1995) (wax paper 
for wrapping raw hamburger patties); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971)) (paper 
plates, napkins, spices). 
99 See, e.g., VISCUSI,. HARRINGTON &  VERNON,supra note 72; JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 175–76 (1988).  
100Tucker v. Apple Computer, 493 F. Supp. 2d 1090.  
101 Note the protests that arose during the Microsoft litigation when a proposed breakup would have 
placed the Windows operating system and the Microsoft applications in the hands of different firms.  The 
complaint was that it would lead to double marginalization.  Kenneth G. Elzinga, David S. Evans & 
Albert L. Nichols, United States v. Microsoft: Remedy or Malady, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 633, 680 
(2001); Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, An Economist’s Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft, 15 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 25 (2001) (“[T]he sum of the operating system and application prices set by an integrated 
monopolist will be lower than the sum of those prices when set separately by two independent firms each 
with significant market power.”); Stan J. Liebowitz, An Expensive Pig in a Poke: Estimating the Cost of 
the District Court’s Proposed Breakup of Microsoft, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 727 (2001); Dari-Mattiacci 
& Parisi, supra note 73. 
102James L. Hamilton & Ibrahim Mqasqas, Double Marginalization and Vertical Integration: New 
Lessons from Extensions of the Classic Case, 62 S. ECON. J. 567, 581–84 (1996).  The outcome can be 
more harmful if one party is a monopolist, the other is an oligopolist, and after the union the monopolist 
cuts off the non-partnering oligopolists.  See Michael Waterson, Vertical Integration, Variable 
Proportions and Oligopoly, 92 ECON. J. 129 (1982). 
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taken by a firm that sold both products together.  Further, profits would be higher for the 
single firm than for the two firms separately, and consumers would be better off 
because output would be higher and prices lower.  In short, the story for complementary 
products is identical to the story for vertical integration, illustrated in the figure, and has 
been known in the economics literature for at least as long.103  Complementary rights in 
intellectual property sold by separate firms can lead to the same result, such as the 
“royalty stacking” that occurs when different firms own patents that are essential to the 
production of some good or process.104  In such cases welfare would be increased if a 
single firm sold the complementary goods. 
Assume that firm A makes a computer while firm B makes a compatible printer.  
Both goods are sold in oligopoly markets at prices above cost.  Given that these prices 
maximize profits, neither firm wishes to cut the price of its own product.  At this point 
firm A would have an incentive to acquire firm B, or vice versa, or perhaps it would enter 
the printer market on its own.  Firm A’s profit-maximizing price for a computer/printer 
combination would be lower than the sum of the prices charged by the separate firms.  
Firm A would also earn more, output would be higher, and consumers would benefit as 
well. 
Firm A could accomplish this in two ways.  It could simply tie computers and 
printers, refusing to sell the two separately.  That would benefit consumers who wanted 
one of each, as most presumably would.  However, it would cut out of the market those 
who needed only one of the two products, perhaps as a replacement.  Alternatively, it 
could charge the single product profit-maximizing price for each product separately but 
a lower price for the combination—that is, it would use a bundled discount to eliminate 
double marginalization for those buyers who regarded the goods as complements at the 
time of purchase.105 
But why shouldn’t we force the firm simply to offer the computer and the printer 
separately at the lower prices that it would charge if they were in the bundle?  This 
would also eliminate the double marginalization and it might satisfy those who find the 
tie unacceptable on some other ground.  For example, suppose that the individual profit-
                                            
103 The theory of double marginalization of complementary products was developed even before 
Cournot, in CHARLES ELLET, JR., AN ESSAY ON THE LAWS OF TRADE, IN REFERENCE TO THE WORKS OF 
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1839); see also R.G.D. ALLEN, MATHEMATICAL 
ANALYSIS FOR ECONOMISTS (1938).  Both are discussed in Dari-Mattiacci & Parisi, supra note 73. 
104See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 82. 
105 See Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 
ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443284; 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, , supra note 38, 
¶1712b; Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 EMORY L.J. 423, 
434–36 (2006).  On the theory, see Michael L. Katz, Vertical Contractual Relations, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 655, 673 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); TIROLE, 
supra note 99, at 174–77.  The same theory has been applied to the bundling of telecommunications 
services.  See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: 
The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L REV. 1822, 1846–47 (2007); Jerry A. Hausman, Gregory K. 
Leonard & J. Gregory Sidak, Does Bell Company Entry into Long-Distance Telecommunications Benefit 
Consumers?, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 483–84 (2002). 
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maximizing prices of the computer and printer are $1000 and $400, respectively, while 
the profit-maximizing price for the package when sold by a single firm is $1200.  Would 
it not be preferable on policy grounds to require the manufacturer to sell the two 
products separately at, say, $900 and $300? 
First of all, if none of the rival printer companies cut their price to match then the 
result would be the same as tying in any event.  That is, the buyer would take both from 
firm A.  Second, however, if one or more of the other printer companies did cut the 
printer price to $300, then firm A would not capture all of the printer sales.  A premise of 
the double-marginalization story is that the price cut on the printer is profitable because 
the manufacturer will obtain the higher output that accrues to both the computer and the 
printer.  If it cannot tie and be assured of getting all of the printer sales, then it will not 
cut its price. 
The double-marginalization explanation of practices such as tying is robust and 
has broad application in markets characterized by single firm dominance or product 
differentiation.106  Tying and bundled discounts can operate as a kind of “reverse 
leverage” in cases where both the bundled products are sold in less than perfectly 
competitive markets.  Indeed, the only time that double-marginalization concerns are 
not relevant is when one of the goods is a fungible commodity sold under highly 
competitive conditions, such as the salt or dry ice in well known tying decisions.107  As a 
result arguments for reviving a version of the leverage theory, such as Einer Elhauge’s 
provocative 2009 article,108 are limited in their scope to the tying of commodities, where 
double-marginalization problems are not likely to arise.  In many cases involving 
bundled discounts, the bundled goods are product-differentiated and specialized and 
the inference of significant price/marginal cost margins is great.109 
D. Antitrust as a Corrective:  Dealer-Induced RPM and the Rule of Reason 
 The other side of the double-marginalization problem is that high transaction 
costs may interfere with manufacturers’ efforts to control it by contract.  At that point the 
legal system becomes relevant and antitrust can be brought to bear in appropriate 
circumstances.  The precondition is reduced output and higher consumer prices. 
 
                                            
106 See TIROLE, supra note 99, at 175. 
107 Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 
U.S. 27, 31–32 (1931).  As one recent decision observed, at least in the printer market manufacturers 
commonly cut the price of the printer (tying product) to cost or even lower and place the markup in the 
cartridge (tied product).  See Xerox Corp. v. Media Sciences, Inc., 660 F.Supp.2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (“As is true of other printer manufacturers, Xerox generally sells its printers at a low margin or a 
loss, hoping to earn a profit through later sales of high margin ink”).   
108 Elhauge,supra note 11. 
109 See, e.g., Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Group, L.P., No. CV 02-4770 MRP, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26916, at *27 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2004) (plaintiff challenging defendant’s discount practices, 
which included bundled discounts, had profit margins of between 45% and 83% during the period of 
claimed exclusion). The Ninth Circuit eventually entered an order finding liability on some claims but not 
others. Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Group, L.P., 2009 WL 3451725 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2009). 
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 A good example is vertical price and nonprice restraints, an area where the TCE 
literature has made important contributions.  The free rider explanation for these 
restrictions, which dates to the 1960s, is but one example.  Manufacturers use resale 
price maintenance and nonprice restraints in order to achieve some of the efficiencies of 
intrafirm distribution while preserving the risk sharing and incentive features of 
contractual distribution mechanisms.  For example, a firm distributing its own product 
would ordinarily provide the optimal level of distribution services.  The free rider 
explanation for RPM shows how it can emulate that level when using independent 
dealers and alternative contractual mechanisms are too costly or ineffectual.  By the 
same token the self-distributing manufacturer would sell its full product line through 
each store.  In a contractual distribution network it may have to offer inducements to 
dealers to carry the full line, often by using RPM in order to guarantee margins on the 
more popular goods so as to prevent “cream skimming” by other retailers.110  
Alternatively, a single firm engaged in self-distribution would place the optimal number 
of stores in a community, and a firm engaged in contractual distribution would try to 
replicate that allocation by using territorial restrictions or other limits on dealer location. 
 
 As noted previously, vertical restraints can often be used to limit double 
marginalization.  However, there may also be situations in which vertical restraints are 
used for the opposite purpose, which is to facilitate or exacerbate double 
marginalization.  These are situations in which bargaining has failed to reach the joint 
maximizing result, and thus the legal system has a role to play.  For example, antitrust 
legitimately has an interest in the problem of dealer cartels or powerful individual 
dealers.111  Well-placed local dealers may be in a position to exercise market power in 
their individual retail markets.  Depending on their power vis-à-vis the manufacturer, 
they may be able to extract RPM on competing dealers for their own benefit, but to the 
detriment of an efficient distribution system.  The cost of moving resources being what it 
is, it may be less costly for the manufacturer to comply than to set up alternative equally 
satisfactory dealerships.  The result will be higher local prices.112 
 
 If the manufacturer has some market power, then the risk of dealership cartels 
and powerful dealers is double marginalization.  The manufacturer sets its profit-
maximizing price, determined by consumer demand less distribution costs.  In that case 
both the manufacturer and consumers are best off if distribution is competitive.  
However, a cartel of locally powerful dealers that is able to impose RPM on the reluctant 
manufacturer can also impose higher prices on consumers.  Once again, whether the 
manufacturer can combat this effectively depends on the circumstances. 
                                            
110See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, ¶¶ 1614f, 1615d; Raymond Deneckere, Howard P. 
Marvel & James Peck, Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance, 111 Q.J. ECON. 
885 (1996); see also David A. Butz, Vertical Price Controls with Uncertain Demand, 40 J.L. & ECON. 
433 (1997); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement 
Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1988). 
111 See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, ¶ 1604. 
112 See, e.g., Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(dealer cartel); Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (powerful 
dealer).  
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It is no answer to say that the manufacturer and the powerful dealer might be 
able to agree on the profit-maximizing output, in which case the manufacturer will earn 
less, the dealer will earn more, but overall output will be the same.  The competitive 
distribution network is still preferable to the bilateral monopoly that results from dealer 
assertions of power that it need not have. 
 
This is fundamentally a problem of transaction costs.  If bargaining worked 
perfectly, a manufacturer and its dealers would agree on the joint maximizing output 
level and negotiate over the division of profits.  But when a powerful established dealer 
can frustrate this by insisting on higher local markups a manufacturer may be powerless 
to resist, particular if vertical integration into retailing is not possible on account of the 
need for distribution by multiproduct retailers.  Famously, Dr. Miles itself was such a 
case, involving RPM instigated by a cartel of retail druggists.113 
 
 What such an antitrust case requires is proof that the RPM is dealer-initiated.  
This itself is problematic because dealers might “initiate” RPM simply by reporting free 
riding, and using RPM to control that is clearly in the best interest of the manufacturer 
as well.  However, in a case such as Toys “R” Us,114 free riding does not seem to be a 
robust explanation.  Further, given that toy retailers sell numerous brands, vertical 
integration into retailing does not seem to be a viable alternative.  The defendant may 
simply have been interfering in manufacturers’ efforts to establish a competitive 
distribution system. 
 
V. Transaction Costs and Price Discrimination 
 Price discrimination occurs when a firm obtains higher ratios of price to marginal 
cost from some buyers than from others.  Systematic price discrimination does not 
occur under perfect competition because, by definition, some prices are not at marginal 
cost.115  So price discrimination presupposes at least some power to set a price above 
marginal cost to particular customers.  The amount of power is not substantial, however, 
and nearly everyone agrees that sufficient market power to have antitrust 
consequences cannot be inferred from the existence of price discrimination alone.116  
Indeed, the world is filled with arrangements, such as fast food franchises, where the 
firms are clearly in highly competitive markets but price discrimination is used to set 
                                            
113See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 331–48 (1991) 
(discussing cartel of retail druggists that used RPM to limit price cutting). 
114 Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 2d 575. 
115 In some cases of nonsustainable predation a firm might charge a pocket of customers a price below 
marginal cost in order to eliminate rivals.  But this is not likely to be a profitable strategy in a perfectly 
competitive market. 
116 See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, ¶ 721; Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost 
Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95, 101 (2002); Benjamin Klein, 
Market Power in Aftermarkets, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 143 (1996); Benjamin Klein, Market 
Power in Franchise Cases in the Wake of Kodak, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 283 (1999); Benjamin Klein & John 
Shepard Wiley, Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual 
Property, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599 (2003). 
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franchise fees proportioned to the amount of franchisee business rather than franchisor 
costs.117 
 The ability to price discriminate need not be a function of monopoly at all and 
often relates to some version of the bilateral monopoly problem.  As noted previously, 
the existence of Coasean markets is quite consistent with robust competition in the 
broader market.  But participants in a Coasean market are locked in to ongoing 
relationships that make price discrimination possible and even desirable, just as the 
firms in a traditional market are.118  For example, in the typical franchise case the 
franchisor and franchisees are joined together by a contract plus a set of previous 
commitments that makes exit undesirable.  This is simply a corollary of the proposition 
that the boundaries of a Coasean market are the same as the boundaries of a firm.119  
In a price discrimination scheme in a traditional market, disfavored purchasers (i.e., 
those charged the higher price) might prefer to escape to alternative arrangements but 
market boundaries prevent them from doing so.  The same thing is true of a Coasean 
market.  Opportunism, bounded rationality, and transaction costs fully explain the 
arrangements. 
For example, a firm about to enter the fast food industry as a supplier can profit 
by sharing risk, and self-employed franchisees may have stronger incentives to do well 
than far-flung employees would.  If the firm built its own restaurants it would expect to 
earn from them in proportion to their relative success, and franchising is an attractive 
alternative to the extent that it replicates this opportunity while permitting franchisee to 
share the risk.  For its part, the nascent franchisee receives a method of doing 
business, a recognized name and product, and the promise of high returns proportional 
to its level of success.  So it willingly puts up its share of the capital (the franchisee fee), 
opens an outlet, and pays either a recurring fee proportional to sales120 or an 
overcharge on various tied consumable products used in the franchised business.121  Ex 
ante, the franchisee knows that its payments are proportional to sales and one certainly 
cannot say that the prospect of high sales and accompanying high franchise fee is a 
deterrent.122  Once entered, these arrangements are profitable and also durable, even 
in competitive markets, because the value of a successful franchise is high and 
extraction is too costly in relation to the available alternatives.  For example, a high 
volume McDonald’s franchise is highly profitable and desirable to its owner, 
                                            
117 E.g., Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 308 (4th Cir. 1980); Ungar v. Dunkin Donuts, 
531 F.2d 1211, 1222 (3d Cir. 1976) (restaurant property, signs, and supplies); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 
Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) (packaging; herbs); see Benjamin Klein & Lester Saft, The Law and 
Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 345, 347–48 (1985); 9 AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra ¶ 1711. 
118 See supra text accompanying notes 53–58. 
119 See supra text accompanying notes 53–58; Hovenkamp, supra note 53. 
120 E.g., Principe, 631 F.2d at 308.  
121 E.g., Siegel, 448 F.2d 43. 
122 The issue has arisen in some franchise tie cases. See, e.g., Little Caesar's Enter., Inc. v. Smith, 34 
F. Supp. 2d 459, 506 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (franchisees knew of tying-plus-overcharge requirement at time 
of signing franchise agreement). 
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notwithstanding that it is also highly profitable to the franchisor and probably at no more 
expense than it incurs with the less successful franchisee. 
 In sum, the phenomenon that makes price discrimination possible in such cases 
is not market power but rather the fact that assets are specialized and that transferring 
to attractive alternative arrangements is not costless.  Down the road a highly 
successful franchisee may become resentful that its franchisor is earning high returns 
on this particular franchisee’s business with no greater effort than it puts into the 
business of less successful franchisees.  But that outcome is a feature of joint risk 
taking.  And indeed, the resentment in this case is odd because one would guess that 
the prospect that a particular franchisee would become highly successful would have 
acted ex ante as an inducement rather than a deterrent to entry. 
 The case of price discrimination in aftermarket products is similar.  Many price 
discrimination ties involve arrangements in which the seller charges a low price 
(sometimes less than marginal cost and sometimes even zero)123 for a tying product, 
but overcharges on a tied product whose use varies with the intensity of use of the tying 
product.  A printer plus the stream of replaceable ink cartridges that a consumer 
purchases is one example.  The Supreme Court’s Kodak decision, which involved the 
tying of aftermarket parts and service for customers who had previously purchased a 
Kodak copier, is another.124 
 The aftermarket price discrimination tie is simply a bilateral monopoly problem in 
which a contract specified in advance determines the terms.  Going in, if the underlying 
market is competitive a customer may be able to choose between a more expensive 
printer with less costly cartridges, or vice versa.  In Kodak the Supreme Court was 
aware of this and made something of the fact that Kodak may have changed its policy 
late in the copy machine’s lifecycle.  As a result customers may have gotten a different 
and less attractive bilateral monopoly deal than the one they had bargained for at the 
beginning.  But that change in policy is clearly not an antitrust problem, although it may 
involve contract law or tortious misrepresentation<<probably both!>>.  Most 
importantly, the story in and of itself does not implicate double marginalization or other 
opportunity for higher output prices.  Indeed, price discrimination in both franchise 
situations and those involving aftermarket parts or service seems to be ubiquitous even 
when the firms lack significant market power.125 
 Price discrimination ties can implicate both traditional monopoly concerns and 
the concerns of transaction cost economics.  Already in the 1950s, Chicago school 
writing on variable-proportion tying arrangements saw them as price discrimination 
devices,126 and the case law had seen them as such far earlier.127  This Chicago school 
                                            
123 See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 105. 
124 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
125 Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 105. 
126 Bowman, supra note 13. 
127See Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896) 
(“These machines have been placed in the hands of shoe dealers . . . at the actual cost of the machines to 
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story was not about transaction costs, however, but rather about the profitable ways in 
which a monopolist might extract its overcharge.  Indeed, Bowman assumed that the 
seller was a monopolist and saw the variable-proportion tie as an alternative to the 
monopolist’s selling of its primary good at different prices to different consumers—a 
result he thought would be undermined by the monopolist’s inability to distinguish high 
and low value customers or to segregate them sufficiently so as to prevent customer 
arbitrage.128  This analysis tended to see gains from price discrimination ties by 
assuming that the seller was a monopolist and comparing output under the tie with 
output under simple linear pricing.  As a result, for example, Bowman saw tying as a 
“use of existing [market] power,” but not as creating the “addition of new power” by 
leveraging.129  In this account the reduction in the price of the tying product typically 
means that many more customers will purchase it, and this in turn tends to produce 
greater sales of the tied product even though its costs are higher.130 
The TCE story is, if anything even more benign because it starts out with a seller 
who is not necessarily a monopolist.  As a result, the welfare gains from the output 
increases that attend price discrimination still apply and competition in the underlying 
market offers even further protection for consumers.  For example, within the Chicken 
Delight franchise tying arrangement, the tie very likely produces an increased number of 
franchises, increased product sales, and increased welfare by both the general welfare 
and the consumer welfare measure.131  But if for some reason it does not, customers 
can always go across the street to Kentucky Fried Chicken or McDonald’s.  Transaction 
cost analysis has improved on Bowman by extending his analysis to the ubiquitous 
situations in which price discrimination ties are imposed by nonmonopolists. 
Price discrimination ties, even by a monopolist, are rarely candidates for 
condemnation on that ground because in the great majority of cases they improve 
consumer as well as general welfare.132  In general, such ties involve second-degree 
price discrimination, which is typically more benign than third-degree price 
discrimination. 
In a third-degree price discrimination scheme a seller is able to identify ex ante 
customers who exhibit differential willingness to pay for some good and charge them 
different prices.  For example, a seller might charge commercial users of its stereo 
equipment $100 and residential users $60.133  This type of discrimination creates a 
                                                                                                                                            
the makers, they expecting a profit on their monopoly alone from the sale of fasteners or staples to those 
having the machine.”); Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 105, at  n.71. 
128 Bowman, supra note 13, at 23. 
129 Id. at 19. 
130 See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 105. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 E.g., Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938) (field of use restriction 
distinguishing commercial and residential users); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(software licensing agreement distinguishing commercial and noncommercial users).  See Christina 
Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474407. 
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discontinuity in marginal valuation that transfers some sales from high-value to low-
value customers.  As a result consumer welfare can be reduced even if output remains 
constant.  In this illustration, for example, a commercial user who valued the stereo at 
$90 would be denied the sale.  Rather, that unit would be sold to someone for $60 even 
though she valued it at far less than $90.  As a result economists have known for nearly 
a century that third-degree price discrimination reduces welfare unless it results in an 
output increase. 
By contrast, in the typical variable proportion tying case the seller reduces the 
price of the tying good and increases the price of the tied good; however, the latter price 
is the same for all.  For example, a manufacturer might cut the price of its printer from 
the stand-alone amount of $400 and instead charge $200, but it would raise the price of 
tied cartridges from $25 to $40.  In that case the seller would earn more from buyers 
who used the printer more intensely, because they would consumer more ink cartridges.  
The distortions come from the reduced price for the printer, which favors consumers 
and brings more of them into the market, but also from the increased price of the 
cartridge, which raises per use variable costs.134  Significantly, however, the higher 
cartridge price is the same for everyone.  Such ties can benefit consumers in a wider 
variety of circumstances, even in the rare case where output falls as a result of the 
tie.135  Further, such arrangements are common even in competitive markets.  As a 
result, as they become less favorable to consumers; switching out becomes more 
attractive. 
This analysis also suggests that vertical restraints that segregate buyers can be 
more harmful price discrimination devices than ties are.  While variable ties represent 
instances of second-degree price discrimination, segregation restraints discriminate in 
the third degree.  For example, the manufacturer who uses vertically imposed customer 
restrictions to segregate customers by class,136 or the patentee who uses field-of-use 
restrictions for the same end,137 is engaged in third degree price discrimination.138  
Welfare harm is more likely, although even here it should not be presumed. 
 
VI. A Brief Note on Foreclosure 
 This article has examined situations in which transaction cost economics can be 
applied to vertical arrangements that threaten undue monopoly output limitations and 
price markups.  Historically, the term “leverage” very largely defined this debate, with 
the structuralists believing that anticompetitive leverage was common, even when the 
                                            
134 Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 105.  See also See Xerox Corp. v. Media Sciences, Inc., 
660 F.Supp.2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (printer/cartridge tying case observing from summary judgment 
record that virtually all printer manufacturers tie by selling the printer at a price of cost or less, and place 
the overcharge in the expendable cartridges). 
135 Id. 
136 See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note  38.at ¶ 1641c (3d ed. 2010) (in press). 
137 Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 304 U.S. 175. 
138 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ¶¶ 1616e, 1647c5 (customer restrictions). 
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affected markets were competitive,139 and the Chicago school largely denying the 
existence of leverage in any form. 
An equally important concern, which I largely leave for another day, is exclusion 
or “foreclosure” of rivals.  Once again the structuralists and the Chicago school 
enthusiastically disagreed with one another.  Led by Harvard-trained economists such 
as Edward S. Mason and Joe S. Bain, the structuralists tended to see entry barriers as 
a prominent feature of the economy, as a natural consequence of large-scale 
manufacturing and product differentiation, and as a principal reason for poor 
performance in concentrated and even not-so-concentrated industries.140  Bain, 
undoubtedly the most prominent industrial organization economist of the structuralist 
school, adopted a consequentialist definition that an entry barrier is any factor in a 
market that permits incumbent firms to “persistently raise their prices above a 
competitive level without attracting new firms to enter the industry.”141 
In sharp contrast, the Chicago school adopted a much stricter neoclassical 
approach that tended to see resources moving freely anytime an imbalance existed 
between profits earned in one place and another.  University of Chicago economist 
George J. Stigler, who was much more concerned that firms not be punished for being 
first movers, adopted a definition of entry barriers as a cost that “must be borne by a 
firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry.”142  
Stigler’s definition was driven by extreme doubts that conduct itself could deter entry.  
Rather, he tended to see entry barriers as a consequence of scale economies or 
government intervention, neither of which should or could be addressed by antitrust law. 
The Antitrust Law treatise has always preferred the Bainian definition, finding it 
more consistent with the policy goals of antitrust law, which is not to attack structure for 
its own sake but rather to identify instances of anticompetitive, entry-deterring 
conduct.143   Most of the case law has followed.144  In defense of this position it is 
                                            
139 E.g., Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31–32 (1931), which concluded that the 
patentee of an ice box could increase its monopoly profits by acquiring a second monopoly on tied dry ice, a 
common commodity.  For critiques, see Bohannan, supra note 133; and Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra 
note 105. 
140EDWARD S. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM (1957); BAIN, 
BARRIERS, supra note 7.  Mason obtained his Ph.D. at Harvard and remained there his entire career; Bain 
obtained his Ph.D. at Harvard under Mason, but spent virtually his entire career at the University of 
California, Berkeley.  See also KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 7 at 70–80, 101–33.  See, e.g., p. 8: 
All sorts of barriers to entry, from large capital requirements to high advertising costs and closely 
held patented technology, are widely characteristic of the economy, though in varying measure in 
different industries.  Frictions, and the influence of uncertainty and risk aversion on business 
decisions, mean that entry and exit often take place with substantial lags after the changes in 
profitability which occasion them. 
141BAIN, BARRIERS, supra note 7, at 5. 
142 GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968). 
143 See 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 18, ¶ 409 at 298-306. [PLEASE LEAVE DATE IN]  For my 
views, see 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ¶ 420c, at 76-79 (making case for Bainian definition in antitrust 
analysis).  See also Richard Schmalensee, Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriers to Entry (MIT Sloan School 
of Management, Working Paper No. 4457-04. Jan. 2004) (agreeing with Antitrust Law on Bainian 
Hovenkamp  Transaction Costs Economics in Antitrust  November, 2010, Page 33 
 
important to note that antitrust law in this post-structuralist era does not punish structure 
as such, but only conduct that is likely to be unreasonably exclusionary under the 
circumstances.  The Bainian definition seems more appropriate to the question being 
asked. The relevant question is not whether more entry should be affirmatively 
encouraged, but rather whether clearly anticompetitive conduct should be deterred.  
Problematically, however, in one of the last embraces of structuralism, Areeda’s and 
Turner’s original edition of Antitrust Law not only adopted the Bainian definition of entry 
barriers but also proposed creation of a purely structural offense of “no-fault” monopoly, 
a position that the present author disputes and both Congress and the courts have 
avoided.145 
TCE has reinvigorated the link between conduct and exclusion.  One example is 
the well-known debate between Areeda and Turner on one side and Oliver Williamson 
on the other over the proper test for predatory pricing.  Williamson believed that the 
Areeda-Turner predatory pricing test was too lenient and did not adequately address the 
threats imposed by longer run strategic behavior.146  Briefly, Williamson believed that 
Areeda’s and Turner’s average variable cost test for actionable predation was much too 
severe on plaintiffs and ignored significant possibilities of exclusionary pricing behavior 
even at above-cost prices.  Another area in which TCE has reinvigorated the analysis of 
exclusionary practices is raising rivals’ costs (RRC), which begins with the premise that 
many exclusionary practices are more easily rationalized as devices for increasing 
rivals’ costs than as mechanisms for excluding them.  In general, the RRC literature has 
attempted to restore a meaningful conception of anticompetitive exclusion without a 
return to the more severe apprehensions of the structuralist school, which tended to 
view rivals and smaller firms as anesthetized patients rather than as vigorous 
competitors with the general ability to respond in kind.147  At least some Chicago school 
                                                                                                                                            
definition); Richard Gilbert, Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incumbency, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 105, at 475, 478 (“a barrier to entry is a rent that is derived from 
incumbency.”). 
144 See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, ch. 4C (discussing decisions). 
145For Areeda’s and Turner’s original proposal, see 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 18, at ¶¶ 614–
24 at 35-70 [LEAVE DATE IN]; for my critique, see 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, ¶ 630a, 
at 67. 
146 See Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975); Williamson’s principal response, Oliver E. 
Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977); and the 
reply, Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Williamson on Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE L.J. 1337 
(1977).  The debate and the current position of Antitrust Law are developed in 3A AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, ¶¶ 729, 736 at 106-121, 135-156. 
147 Good contributions to the RRC literature include Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, 
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); 
Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983).  Good, 
less technical discussions of TCE and strategic behavior include Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, 
Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN.L.REV. 743 (2005); Meese,supra note 67; Joshua D. 
Wright, The Chicago School, Transaction Cost Economics and the Roberts Court’s Antitrust 
Jurisprudence, in ELGAR COMPANION TO TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (Peter G. Klein & Michael E. 
Sykuta, eds., forthcoming),  available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1144883).   
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writers have been very critical.148 Resources are in fact quite mobile, but transaction 
costs and the other attendant costs of resource movement must be taken into account 
as well. 
“Exclusionary” distribution agreements can present analogous problems in 
transaction cost analysis.  For example, interbrand free riding can be a particular 
problem for manufacturers dealing through multibrand retailers.149  Ordinarily a 
manufacturer engaged in self-distribution would not have an incentive to retail the 
products of rivals in addition to its own.  Exclusivity arrangements imposed on dealers 
can make the manufacturer/dealer relationship behave more like a firm behaves.150  
Nevertheless, exclusive dealing and foreclosing ties can also impair competition.151  
Other things equal, a dealer and its customers are best off when supply markets are 
competitive, and unreasonably exclusionary arrangements can prevent such 
competition from occurring. 
VII. Conclusion 
 This brief discussion of antitrust issues belies the complexity of analysis in 
individual cases.  For example, market power must be established and the line between 
efficient and harmful bargaining will typically not be as clear as the illustrations suggest. 
One advantage that both the structuralist school and the Chicago school had over TCE 
antitrust analysis was their simplicity.  Within the structuralist paradigm, industrial 
concentration explained everything and most inferences were drawn in favor of 
condemnation.  Within Chicago school analysis, the impossibility of leveraging and the 
mobility of resources explained everything and most inferences were drawn in favor of 
exculpation.   Transaction cost analysis is different, however; typically more specific to 
the situation and requiring particularly close scrutiny in cases where significant market 
                                                                                                                                            
For a critique, see John E. Lopatka & Paul E. Godek, Another Look at Alcoa: Raising Rivals’ Costs Does 
not Improve the View, 35 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1992). 
148 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 37, at 196  (describing RRC as “not a happy formula”); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 HOUS. L .REV. 953, 959 (2005) (deeply critical of exclusionary 
practices theories, including RRC); Frank H. Easterbrook, When is it Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search 
for Exclusionary Conduct, 2003 COL. BUS. L. REV. 345, 346–47 (2003) (similar).  However, one 
prominent Chicago school economist sees much more promise in the theory of RRC, but also difficulties 
in administration.  See Dennis W. Carlton, The Relevance for Antitrust Policy of Theoretical and 
Empirical Advances in Industrial Organization, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 47, 50–54 (2003).   On the 
Chicago school and RRC, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
147, 159–60 (2005). 
149 See, e.g., 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1812 (2d ed. 2005)  (use of exclusive 
dealing to control interbrand free riding, which can occur when a dealer that sells multiple brands can 
apply dealer investments made by one supplier for the benefit of a different supplier). 
150 See, e.g., 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note <<38 ok?>>, ¶ 1717 (discussing great variety of 
transaction cost savings from tying); 10 id., with Einer Elhauge at ¶ 1745 (relevance of transaction costs 
to “separate products” test); 11 HOVENKAMP, supra note 149 at ¶ 1811 (transaction cost savings 
justifying exclusive dealing). 
151 See, e.g., 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38,  ¶¶ 1704, 1709 (foreclosure); 11 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 149, ¶ 1802 (foreclosure effects from exclusive dealing) and ¶ 1803 (foreclosure 
effects from output contracts). 
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power is either present or realistically threatened.  As a result, the transaction costs of 
operating the legal system are necessarily higher. 
 Nevertheless, in cases challenging purely vertical arrangements the strong 
presumptive rule must be legality.  Anticompetitive deviations are not so exceptional 
that antitrust policy can ignore them, but not so common that they should be presumed. 
  
 
 
